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I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to George Fletcher, “no idea testifies more powerfully to 
individuals as a source of value than the principle of consent.”1 
Bolstered by a social contract ideology that prioritizes conceptions of 
individual personhood, linear models of progress and regimes for the 
* Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, School of Law, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. 
Email: vanessa.munro@nottingham.ac.uk. With the usual caveats, thanks are due to Sharon Cowan 
for her comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to colleagues involved in the 
original LSA Conference Panel on this topic for their invitation to join with them in contributing to 
this symposium. 
 1. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 109 (1996). 
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protection of private property, the capacity to give consent has certainly 
played a key role in the Anglo-American legal context, serving – 
amongst other things – to accredit the human being with the status of 
serious and rational agent, and to respect individuals as entities for 
whom the distinction between self and other, and between mine and 
thine, has profound significance.2  In turn, the consent threshold has 
often been used in contemporary liberal societies to demarcate the 
terrain between acceptable and unacceptable intrusions upon property / 
bodies, generating what Heidi Hurd has called its ‘moral magic’ in its 
operation as a transformative channel between the harmful and the 
harmless, and also thereby between the permissible, the condemnable 
and the criminal.3 
At the same time, however, the presumptions that underpin this 
conventional understanding of consent have come under increasing 
scrutiny.  Influenced by Marxist, feminist, and critical race analyses of 
entrenched power disparity, as well as by Foucaultian insights into the 
proliferation of normalizing techniques in modern society, theorists have 
highlighted the constructed nature of choice, challenging thereby the 
assumption of unconstrained freedom that animates the conventional 
account.  In addition, these theorists have drawn upon the work of 
communitarian thinkers in order to deconstruct the myth of the detached 
and abstract human agent by illustrating the inevitability of mutual inter-
dependence and the profound influence of community and inter-personal 
relationships in framing each person’s sense of self, and self-
determination. 
The implications of these debates over the role and legitimacy of 
conventional accounts of consent have been felt across a number of 
areas of legal, political, and moral theory.  In this article, however, 
attention will be focused exclusively on their relevance for our 
understanding of, and responses to, sexual consent.  More specifically, 
 2. John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 193, 207 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).  For further discussion on the 
role and relevance of consent in the liberal context, see, for example, JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME I: HARM TO OTHERS (1984), JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME III: HARM TO SELF (1986), HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS 
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963), and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude 
Himmelfarb ed., 1974). 
 3. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996). This special 
issue was dedicated to the issue of consent.  See also Alan Wertheimer, Consent and Sexual 
Relations, 2 LEGAL THEORY 89 (1996); Heidi M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its 
Implications for the Law of Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147 (1996); Joan McGregor, Why When She 
Says No She Doesn’t Mean Maybe and Doesn’t Mean Yes: A Critical Reconstruction of Consent, 
Sex, and The Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 175 (1996). 
2
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this article will examine recent legislative efforts, in England and Wales, 
to construct a criminal rape code that reflects a more context-sensitive 
understanding of the consent threshold, and insists upon the 
development of a more communicative terrain for socio-sexual 
interaction.  There is little doubt that the resulting Sexual Offences Act 
2003 represents a well-intentioned intervention, and it can indeed be 
seen to offer some significant improvements.4  At the same time, 
however, it will be argued that the legislative framework does (perhaps, 
can do) little to recognize, let alone problematize, the complex ways in 
which entrenched power disparities, material inequalities, relational 
dynamics, and socio-sexual norms operate to construct and constrain not 
only women’s ability to say ‘no’ to male sexual initiative, and to have 
that refusal accredited both by society and law, but also – and perhaps 
even more problematically – to say ‘yes,’ at least in the kind of free and 
unfettered way that the liberal model of autonomy often seems to 
presume. 
In order to explore these issues within the confines of this article, 
discussion will be broken down into three main parts.  In the first 
section, the nature and parameters of the conventional understanding of 
consent will be examined in more detail and the contemporary 
challenges that have been lodged against it – particularly from those 
 4. For an overview of the reform process, see Law Commission, Consent in Sexual Offences: 
A Report to the Home Office Sex Offences Review, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/consent.pdf 
(2000); United Kingdom Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual 
Offences, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/vol1main.pdf?view=Binary (2000); United 
Kingdom Home Office, Protecting the Public – Strengthening Protection Against Sex Offenders 
and Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/protecting-
the-public.pdf?view=Binary (2002); United Kingdom Home Office, Convicting Rapists and 
Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-
290306-justice-rape-victims?view=Binary (Spring 2006) [hereinafter Home Office, Convicting 
Rapists]; United Kingdom Home Office, Sexual Offences Act 2003: A Stocktake of the Effectiveness 
of the Act Since its Implementation,  
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/sexual/sexual24.pdf (2006).  For general discussion 
of the implications of the reforms, see Nicola Lacey, Beset by Boundaries: The Home Office Review 
of Sexual Offences, 2001 CRIM. L. REV. 3; Philip Rumney, The Review of Sexual Offences and Rape 
Law Reform: Another False Dawn?, 64 MOD. L. REV. 890 (2001); Jennifer Temkin & Andrew 
Ashworth, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent, 2004 
CRIM. L. REV. 328; Andrew Bainham & Belinda Brooks-Gordon, Reforming the Law on Sexual 
Offences, in SEXUALITY REPOSITIONED 261 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., 2004); Vanessa 
Munro, Dev’l-in Disguise? Harm, Privacy and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, in SEXUALITY AND 
THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 1 (Vanessa Munro & Carl Franklin Stychin eds., 2007); Sharon 
Cowan, Freedom and Capacity to Make a Choice: A Feminist Analysis of Consent in the Criminal 
Law of Rape, in SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 51 (Vanessa Munro & Carl 
Franklin Stychin eds., 2007); FRANCIS BENNION, SEXUAL ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITIQUE 
OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES BILL 2003 (2003); and John Spencer, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: 
Children and Family Offences, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 347. 
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influenced by structural, post-structural, and communitarian analyses – 
will be considered.  With the terrain of these debates on consent – and 
related concepts such as autonomy, agency, and self-determination – in 
place, the second section of this article will focus specifically upon their 
implications in the context of sexual consent in general, and women’s 
sexual consent in particular.  It will outline the development of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales, and will discuss some 
of the merits and demerits of the approach adopted towards rape as a 
criminal offence therein.  Having done so, discussion in the final part 
will examine a number of the more fundamental difficulties posed by 
this legislation’s instigation of a consent threshold that centers upon such 
theoretically contested, and malleable, concepts as ‘freedom,’ ‘capacity,’ 
and ‘reasonableness.’  Juxtaposing the presumptions that often lie behind 
these concepts in conventional liberal accounts with the messy and 
multi-faceted realities of women’s daily lives, this section will examine 
the adequacy of the legal response in terms of its ability to both reflect 
and respond to the experiential patterns of (hetero)sexual initiative. 
II.  UNCOVERING THE ‘CON’ IN CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF CONSENT 
If, as social contract theorists have argued, our collective consent 
(real or hypothesized) provided the mechanism through which the 
institutional framework from which all modern law emanates was 
established,5 it follows that consent must in some ultimate sense be the 
master of law.  In reality, however, there are a number of difficulties 
with such an analysis.  For one thing, there are significant practical 
barriers to revocation of consent in a world in which established 
structures and processes – even flawed ones – are self-perpetuating, and 
often preferable to a world of chaotic anarchism.  In addition, the 
assertion that consent is the master of law neglects or at least trivializes 
the complex and powerful ways in which the dictates of law and 
institutions of the state, once established, operate to construct the very 
mechanisms of, and parameters for communicating, consent. 
Indeed, as a number of critics have argued, this contractarian 
perspective is premised on a dubious understanding of power as a 
largely unilateral and one-dimensional force.6  Law is presumed to be 
 5. While united by this contractarian perspective, it is clear that leading theorists in this 
tradition also engage in some significant disagreements as to the detail of how, and to whom, this 
allegiance is promised - see, for example, THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Crawford B. MacPherson 
ed., 1968); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1963); and JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (George D.H. Cole ed., 1968). 
 6. For critique of the social contract tradition, and its treatment of women’s position in 
4
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something issued by an identifiable sovereign, through a vehicle of 
command or prohibition, to a collective who have authorized and 
accepted their own subservient position.  The upshot of this analysis is 
not only a commitment to the legitimacy and neutrality of the imposition 
of law’s force, but also an insistence that areas of social living that are 
unregulated by such prohibitive commands are, therefore, areas in which 
the human agent has a free and unfettered remit for individual self-
determination.7 
While offering a more nuanced analysis of the origins of the state 
and the basis for legitimate authority, it is often argued that these core 
commitments continue to animate contemporary legal and political 
thinking.8  The links between this contractarian hypothesis and 
liberalism are strong, traceable via chains of influence from Rousseau to 
Kant, through the Enlightenment, and into a modern period in which 
rationalism and individualism have been reified as prerequisites for, and 
paradigm manifestations of, effective citizenship.9  Subjectivity is 
expressed here primarily through the exercise of agency, and consent 
particular, see, for example, CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); and Carole 
Pateman & Teresa Brennan, Mere Auxilliaries to the Commonwealth – Women and the Origins of 
Liberalism, 27 POLITICAL STUDIES 183 (1979). This challenge to the one-way projection of 
authority underpinning the contract model has been re-iterated, moreover, in the context of other 
approaches, e.g. Austin’s command model of law – see, for example, HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) and (from a quite different perspective) ALAN HUNT & 
GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994).  
This failure to recognize the ‘force’ of law’s imposition has also been challenged, for example, in 
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundations of Authority’, in DECONSTRUCTION AND 
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
 7. For critique of this public/private distinction, see, for example, Ruth Gavison, Feminism 
and the Public / Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) and Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the 
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (2000). 
 8. For extended discussion of the links between the historical and contemporary uses of the 
concept of consent, see, for example, Maria Drakopoulou, Feminism and Consent: A Genealogical 
Inquiry, in CHOICE AND CONSENT: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY (Sharon 
Cowan & Rosemary Hunter eds., 2008). 
 9. See Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT – IMMANUEL 
KANT’S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 132 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1949); IMMANUEL KANT, 
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS (Ted Humphrey 
trans., 1983); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1964); 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1965); IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (Werner Pluhar trans., 1987).  Indeed, Kant explicitly 
expressed his indebtedness to Rousseau, especially for his belief in the common man, and for 
having “first discovered universal human nature beneath the multiplicity of adopted human forms, 
and the hidden law . . . .” CARL FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL 
AND POLITICAL WRITINGS xxiii (1949).  See also BARRY HINDESS, DISCOURSES OF POWER: FROM 
HOBBES TO FOUCAULT (2001); Patrick Riley, On Kant as the Most Adequate Social Contract 
Theorist, 1 POL. THEORY 450 (1973). 
5
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continues to be the presumed (yet rarely interrogated) mode of its 
communication.10  Accrediting the articulation or refusal of consent with 
core significance, this liberal model – like its contractarian predecessor – 
often presumes a particular conception of the subject and an abstract, 
rational and self-serving framework for the operation of agency.  
Granted, as Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly pointed out, “‘liberalism’ 
is not a single position but a family of positions,”11 and there is a danger 
in assuming too much unity amongst disparate liberal thinkers.  That 
said, however, critics have identified a tendency in certain strands of 
liberal theory to analyze social problems by removing actors from their 
everyday environment, stripping them of the characteristics and 
relationships that influence their choices, and placing them in a sterile 
legal world where complex dilemmas are resolved by detached models 
of distributive justice and invocation of self-interested and conflict-
oriented claims.12  This can be seen, they insist, in the work of John 
Rawls, who invokes the veil of ignorance to remove from social agents 
all knowledge of their class, talents, aspirations, relationships, etc. as a 
necessary precursor to unencumbered (and, by implication, ‘purer’) 
reasoning about social justice;13 or alternatively, in the work of Ronald 
Dworkin, who imposes a framework premised on equal concern and 
respect, which operates on a presumption that other-regarding desires or 
preferences (and the underlying attachments they represent) be 
 10. For further discussion, and critique of this assumption, see, for example, KATHY 
FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FEMINIST THEORY (1993); KAREN 
GREEN, THE WOMAN OF REASON: FEMINISM, HUMANISM AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1995); 
GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: ‘MALE’ AND ‘FEMALE’ IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 
(1993); EVA FEDE KITTAY, WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1987); and 
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMANUEL KANT (Robin May Schott ed., 1997). 
 11. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57 (1999). 
 12. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (1992). 
 13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 516 (1972).  See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 453 (2000).  For further discussion of this aspect of Rawls’ work and its implications for 
women’s lives, see SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND 
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS (1992); SUSAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE 
FAMILY (1989); Susan Okin, John Rawls: Justice as Fairness – For Whom?, in FEMINIST 
INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 181 (Mary Shanley and Carole Pateman eds., 1994); 
Susan Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2004); Martha 
Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS (Samuel Richard 
Freeman ed., 2003); Annette Baier, The Need for More than Justice, in JUSTICE AND CARE: 
ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 47 (Virginia Held ed., 1995); ALISON M. JAGGAR, 
FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
and ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997). 
6
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disregarded as distortive and ‘vulgar’ influences on the acceptable face 
of utilitarianism.14 
Critics have argued that such abstract and individualist approaches 
are fundamentally counter-intuitive at the level of human experience, 
and have sought to illustrate the role that the rhetoric of liberalism (in 
particular, its characteristic claims to neutrality, objectivity, and 
universality) has played in both disguising the complex realities of 
consent and obscuring the extent to which human agency is curtailed to 
comply with this artificial framework.  Seeking to contextualize 
concepts of agency, subjectivity, and autonomy in the concrete realm of 
social interaction and contemporary power relations, these critics have, 
in their different ways, called for a re-evaluation of the prevailing notion 
of consent and a replacement of its image of unfettered self-determinism 
with a more realistic account of the constructed operation of choice in 
specific human situations. 
A. The Structural Challenge 
Those claiming to speak on behalf of marginalized and oppressed 
social groups have lodged a radical challenge to the dualistic vision of 
consensually imposed ‘public’ authority and an unregulated ‘private’ 
sphere of freedom.  Whether premised on axes of class, gender, or race, 
it has been argued that the freedom of some individuals (members of 
privileged / dominant groups) is secured in contemporary society at the 
expense of the freedom of others.  Mirroring the contractarian vision of 
power as a commodity held in the hands of some whilst being 
systematically denied from the ownership of others, these critics 
emphasize that the basis on which this dynamic is established lacks 
legitimacy.  The social fault lines created by this are, in turn, deeply 
(albeit often subtly) entrenched - distribution of material wealth, as well 
as of social opportunity and personal expectation, maps onto these 
power structures, embedding the marginalized group in a position of 
weakness and dependency, and satiating its members’ needs just enough 
 14. Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 360-
61 (1985).  For discussion and critique of this position, see, for example, Herbert Lionel Adolphus 
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198 (1983). 
Despite its relevance to the critique of liberalism, there has been relatively little direct feminist 
engagement with Dworkin on this matter – notable exceptions to this, however, are Nicola Lacey, 
Closure and Critique in Feminist Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both 
Camps?, in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 167 
(1998); VALERIE KERRUISH, JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY (1991); and DRUCILLA CORNELL, AT 
THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX AND EQUALITY (1998). 
7
Munro: Constructing Consent
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
MUNRO_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:23 PM 
930 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:923 
 
to imbue this hierarchy with a gloss of egalitarianism that manages 
(without redressing) discontent.15 
In a context in which this dynamic of oppressor / oppressed marks 
the social and legal landscape, theorists from Karl Marx to Catharine 
MacKinnon and beyond have questioned liberalism’s uncritical faith in 
the ideal of consent and in the rational and autonomous chooser that is 
presumed to populate its operation.  The scope for self-determination 
afforded to the disempowered is radically reduced, not just by formal 
prohibitions that deny the availability of certain choices, but also by 
informal mechanisms that render certain choices too costly – financially, 
socially, or personally – to be realistic options.  Lack of flexible working 
practices, or of affordable childcare, for example – when coupled with a 
sex-specific capacity for reproduction and a strong social mandate for 
women to act as primary child-carers – undermine the pursuit of gender 
equality in the workplace.  In the formal liberal model, however, it is the 
creation of the opportunity that matters, even when absent the broader 
social and cultural shifts required to render its selection viable.  
Consequently, under current conditions, women’s lower uptake is 
construed as indicative of their lack of interest in this choice, rather than 
as a potential symptom of their disempowerment and their inability to 
take what they want.16 
Conversely, moreover, this critique emphasizes the artificiality of 
the conventional model not only in those contexts in which 
 15. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, in regard to gender relations, “[t]he liberal state 
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender – 
through its legitimating norms [including neutrality], forms, relations to society, and substantive 
policies.” CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 (1989) 
[hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY].  See also Catharine MacKinnon, 
Feminism, Marxism, Method, & The State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 3, 515 (1982); Catharine 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, & The State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 
4, 635 (1983); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; and – for more recent discussion – see, 
CATHARINE MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS (2005) and CATHARINE MACKINNON, 
ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES (2006). 
 16. Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, in AMERICAN FEMINIST 
THOUGHT AT CENTURY’S END: A READER 382-83 (Linda Kauffman ed., 1993); CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2001).  For further discussion of the limits of this approach, see also, 
for example, Patricia Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 837 (1990); 
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA (1984); 
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE 
REFORM (1991); and SYLVIA WALBY, GENDER TRANSFORMATIONS (1997). For extended analysis 
of the deployment of ‘choice’ in contemporary neo-liberal privatization of care-taking 
responsibilities, see also Gillian Calder, The Personal is Economic: Unearthing the Rhetoric of 
Choice in the Canadian Maternity and Parental Leave Benefit Debates, in CHOICE AND CONSENT, 
supra note 8. 
8
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disempowered persons / groups say no to a choice that is open to them 
only in theory, but also in situations in which they say yes to certain 
options.  In a world in which survival on the best possible terms requires 
aligning oneself as closely as possible to those who have power, it is 
argued that we should treat with suspicion those ‘choices’ that comply 
with the demands of the dominant or that work to maintain the current 
power relations.  Just as workers ‘consent’ to all kinds of exploitative 
employment practices out of necessity, so too it is argued that women 
‘consent’ to heterosexual relationships and procreation in order to 
benefit from male protection.17  In both cases, however, the reality is one 
of ‘submit to survive’ rather than a reflection of genuine autonomy.  The 
alternatives are too unpleasant, too draining, or too dangerous to be 
meaningful, and compliance with the hegemony emerges as the 
inevitable conclusion. 
B.  The Post-Structural Challenge 
The work of Michel Foucault has been central to the development 
of the post-structural challenge.18  In positing modern power as a 
pervasive force that infiltrates all aspects of social living through the 
invocation of normative expectations and discursive discipline, 
Foucault’s work not only highlights the artificiality of the notion of 
unregulated social space, but challenges the attendant contention that 
individuals have a free and unfettered remit for self-determination within 
these confines.  Emphasizing the extent to which power is a normalizing, 
rather than primarily repressive, force, Foucault insists that control of the 
individual in modern society is ensured, not through direct state 
repression but through strategies of discipline that ensure self-regulation 
towards prioritized norms.19  As a result, while Foucault continues to 
 17. See, for example, SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 
267-68 (1975); Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in 
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 368-69 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977); and Adrienne 
Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 636-67 (1980). 
 18. See, in particular, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH – THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER / KNOWLEDGE – SELECTED INTERVIEWS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-77 (Colin Gordon trans., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, POWER / 
KNOWLEDGE]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, VOLUME I]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME II: THE USE OF PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1985); and 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME III: THE CARE OF THE SELF (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1986). 
 19. FOUCAULT, POWER / KNOWLEDGE, supra note 18, at 73-74. 
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take the individual as his point of theoretical departure, he rejects any 
metaphysical assumption that the world is populated by autonomous, 
self-legislating moral subjects.  On the contrary, he argues that the 
human subject is produced by, and reflective of, the norms and power 
dynamics of social life: subjected rather than transcendent, and a 
constructed identity rather than organic entity.20 
One of the distinguishing features of the modern, disciplinary 
society, according to Foucault, is the extent to which power “circulate[s] 
through progressively finer channels.”21  It operates at the ‘capillaries’ 
of existence, “seep[ing] into the very grain of individuals, reach[ing] 
right into their bodies, permeat[ing] their gestures, their postures, what 
they say, how they learn to live and work with other people.”22  This 
makes the disciplinary dictates of such power relations not only 
pervasive but also extremely effective, bolstering the illusion of freedom 
whilst restricting the remit for choice.  While this is not to dismiss the 
possibility of resistance - indeed, according to Foucault, wherever there 
is a power relation, there is also, by definition, scope for resistance - it is 
to challenge the ideal of transcendent freedom and the notion of 
unfettered self-determination that critics argue form a central pillar of 
the liberal account.  The individual may exercise creativity in the way in 
which her existence is fashioned, but the practices through which this is 
achieved are always, if not determined by, then at least framed in 
relation to, the socio-cultural context.  These ‘practices of the self’ are 
“not something that the individual invents . . . [but] patterns that he finds 
in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed upon him 
by his culture, his society and his social group.”23 
 20. Id.  In Foucault’s own words, “the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on 
by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a 
relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.”  Id. 
 21. Sandra Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power, in 
FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT: REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE 79 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds., 
1988). 
 22. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE WILL TO TRUTH 216 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1980). 
 23. Michel Foucault, The Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in THE FINAL 
FOUCAULT 11 (James Bernauer & David Rasmussen eds., 1988). The implications of much of this 
analysis of power, resistance and subversion are developed further in the context of gender relations 
by Judith Butler – see, in particular, JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE – FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER – ON THE DISCURSIVE 
LIMITS OF ‘SEX’ (1993); and JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004). However, this direction of 
feminist analysis has also attracted considerable criticism – see, for example, FEMINISM AND 
FOUCAULT, supra note 21;  NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES – POWER, DISCOURSE AND 
GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF MICHEL 
FOUCAULT (Susan Hekman ed., 1996); LOIS MCNAY, FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM: POWER, GENDER 
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As with the structural challenge, then, this post-structural analysis 
emphasizes the extent to which the scope for, and expression of, consent 
is both constructed and curtailed by broader social imperatives.  But 
where the structural critic has focused upon macro-level forces and 
systematic power disparities (mapping variously onto class, gender, or 
race divisions), the post-structural critic has argued for a more fluid 
conception of power, leading in turn to a concern with the self-
regulatory influence of disciplinary norms.24  By constructing the 
subject who ‘chooses’ conformity within the confines of the socially 
prescribed, it is argued that such discipline undermines the very 
legitima
C.  The Communitarian Challenge 
To the extent that one’s community and relational context provide 
vital components of the infrastructure through which disciplinary 
discourses circulate, as well as offering localized vectors for the 
expression of broader axes of group-based oppression, the 
communitarian challenge to liberalism in general, and to its conceptions 
of subjectivity and agency in particular, can be seen as allied in 
important ways to both the structural and the post-structural critique.  At 
the same time, however, the origins of communitarianism remain 
distinctive and the contours of its utopian vision are markedly different – 
in both form and content – from those that animate structural claims to 
revolution or post-structural calls for resistance.  As such, it merits 
independent treatment. 
At the heart of the communitarian challenge is an insistence that the 
starting point for analysis – in legal, political, and moral theory – should 
be the social rather than the individual.  From the outset, this approach 
turns the tables on certain key strands of liberal thinking by showing that 
“the autonomous individual agent is itself a product of social 
construction,” which is embedded in a particular context.25  In so doing, 
it maintains that “if liberalism is true as a social theory, this is only 
AND THE SELF (1992); and CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, UP AGAINST FOUCAULT: EXPLORATIONS OF 
SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM (1993). 
 24. See Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32 (Paul 
Rabinow ed., 1984). For further discussion of the similarities and tensions between these 
approaches, see, for example, Vanessa Munro, On Power and Domination: Feminism and the Final 
Foucault, 2 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 79 (2003); Alan Hunt, Getting Marx and Foucault Into Bed 
Together!, 31 J. L. & SOC’Y 592 (2004); and AMY ALLEN, THE POWER OF FEMINIST THEORY: 
DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, SOLIDARITY (1999). 
 25. ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST 
CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE 57 (1983). 
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because it is, in a wider sense, false.”26  It is argued that this 
conventional preoccupation with the individual is not only misguided 
but also impoverished.  By excluding from consideration issues of 
personal affection and phenomenological experience, communitarian 
theorists argue that the liberal tradition has perpetuated a highly abstract 
conception of agency and a largely hollow account of what it is to be a 
self-aware and socially immersed being.  Humans are inherently inter-
dependent, necessarily situated in, and at least partially constituted by, 
the communities in which they live, the traditions in which they are 
raised, and the associations they form with others.27  What’s more, these 
are not conditions that can – or should – be transcended in the pursuit of 
abstract individualism, since to do so would distort the realities of 
human existence and deny the value and meaning attributable to its 
relational dimensions.28 
Communitarian critics insist, then, that liberalism maintains its 
rhetoric of unconstrained self-determination (reflected in and 
represented by prevailing consent thresholds) only by abstracting the 
individual from the social dynamics and relational commitments that 
inform the very exercise of human agency.  In so doing, however, they 
point out that it not only offers a vision of social interaction that is 
fundamentally unrealistic, unachievable, and undesirable, but disguises 
the extent to which such communitarian imperatives pose their own 
dangers (of undue conservatism or subservience to the demands of 
others, for example), which must be both acknowledged and opened up 
to critical scrutiny.29 
D.  Towards a Critical Consensus on Consent? 
Despite the considerable differences in priority and emphasis within 
these accounts, then, there is consensus that consent as a moral and legal 
 26. Id. 
 27. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1999); 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); and ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY (1990). 
 28. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 152-53 (1982); 
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF – THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989); and, 
generally, THE COMMUNITARIAN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller 
& Jeffrey Paul eds., 1996). 
 29. For discussion of these concerns, with particular reference to their implications for 
women, see, amongst others - Nicola Lacey, Community in Legal Theory: Idea, Ideal or Ideology?, 
in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS, supra note 14, at 125; Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern 
Friendship – Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHICS 275 (1989); SUSAN J. HEKMAN, MORAL 
VOICES, MORAL SELVES (1995); and FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 25. 
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notion may only support the normative significance attributed to it in 
much liberal theory on the basis of a suspect understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and society.  Such a theory, it is 
argued, presents its subject as highly atomistic, depicting society as a 
voluntary and equal association of self-sufficient individuals, each 
capable of making free decisions about how best to live their lives.30   
Although – at the level of theory and intuition – there may be a 
number of difficulties with this account, in the legal arena, where a 
reminiscent pull towards the abstract has often been identified, it has 
nonetheless proven to be particularly resilient.  In contexts ranging from 
contract to medical law, standards for the issuing of consent have been 
created in which – for the most part – there is an emphasis on principles 
of caveat emptor and informed decision-making, even in situations in 
which there are profound disparities of power between the parties or a 
dearth of alternatives for consideration.  In the regulation of sexuality, 
moreover, where a delicate balance is called for between permitting 
expression and prohibiting violation, the standard legal form has been 
similarly formulaic and disconnected from the terrain of contemporary 
socio-sexual interaction.  In the next section, the criticisms lodged at this 
approach will be considered and recent legislative efforts in England and 
Wales – which were designed, in part, to provide an affirmative and 
context-sensitive standard for consent – will be examined. 
III.  SEXUAL CONSENT AND THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 
Feminist engagement on consent, and on women’s sexual consent 
in particular, is clearly mirrored in and influenced by the criticisms of 
the conventional conception of agency discussed above.  Susan Estrich’s 
distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘real’ rape,31 for example, has been 
repeatedly deployed to challenge the ways in which social imperatives 
(or disciplinary techniques) construct norms of gendered sexual behavior 
against which women are judged, both by society and by law.32  The 
 30. For further critique, see, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the 
Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL'Y & L. 13 (1999); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS (2003); Sabina 
Lovibond, Meaning What We Say – Feminist Ethics and The Critique of Humanism, 215-20 NEW 
LEFT REVIEW 98 (1996); and RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, 
AGENCY AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
 31. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10 (1987). 
 32. See, for example, in the UK context, ZSUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL (1987); SEX 
CRIMES ON TRIAL: THE USE OF SEXUAL EVIDENCE IN SCOTTISH COURTS (Beverley Brown, Michele 
Burman & Lynn Jamieson eds., 1993); JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (2d ed. 
2002); and SUE LEES, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE – RAPE ON TRIAL (1996). 
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female body, it is argued, has been analyzed, “qualified and 
disqualified—as being thoroughly saturated with sexuality,”33 with 
medical and psychological discourses justifying the prohibition of 
various social and sexual activities from women on the basis of claims to 
an inherently dangerous female sexuality, which is seen to be in 
perpetual need of (beneficent) control.  Women who exhibit non-
conforming behavior in this context – by drinking alcohol, dressing 
provocatively, or initiating intimacy – are deemed to have sent out 
signals of sexual interest which cannot be easily revoked when 
subsequently relied upon by an observer.  At the same time, male 
sexuality is depicted as uncontrollably natural, consisting of 
overwhelming urges and desires, which leaves the male sexual 
imperative and its utilization of coercive strategies of sexual persuasion 
(a.k.a. courtship) unchecked.34 
Concerned by the (in)ability of the consent threshold to secure 
justice in a context in which sexual stereotyping is prevalent and 
powerful, this critique highlights the contributory role of a courtroom 
culture in which adversarial methods and dichotomous outcomes prevail, 
with the result that the defendant’s acquittal is equated with his 
innocence and with sexual complicity and deceit on the complainant’s 
part.  Although non-consent is a required element in many crimes, these 
critics point out that in rape trials this threshold is operationalized in a 
context of profound suspicion of female sexuality.  As Nagire Naffine 
puts it:  
[R]ape is a crime whose setting is a society where women are expected 
to repress their desires, where they are expected to want what a man 
wants, where women’s sexual wishes are actively (though never 
completely) suppressed or rendered mysterious or incredible whenever 
they cease to fit the possessive form.35 
One of the upshots of this is an insistence that women who are 
treated as passive and powerless in other matters are nonetheless 
 33. FOUCAULT, VOLUME I, supra note 18, at 104. See also ROSALYN DIPROSE, THE BODIES 
OF WOMEN: ETHICS, EMBODIMENT AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (1994); KATHY DAVIS, EMBODIED 
PRACTICES: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY 3 (1997). 
 34. Evidence of these attitudes can be found in a range of studies – for example, see Amnesty 
International, Sexual Assault Research Summary Report, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16618; and for general discussion of 
psychological research on attitudes to rape, see, for example, COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1995); and NICOLA 
GAVEY, JUST SEX?: THE CULTURAL SCAFFOLDING OF RAPE (2005). 
 35. Ngaire Naffine, Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape, 57 MOD. L. REV. 10, 34-35 
(1994). 
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required to be strong, aggressive, and powerful in rejecting intimacy.36  
Standards used in rape laws typically direct attention to the 
complainant’s, rather than (or at least as much as) the defendant’s, 
behavior, and normative expectations regarding the proper feminine role 
influence decision-making at all stages of the legal system: women, who 
are conditioned to attribute sexual violation to the (im)propriety of their 
own conduct, do not recognize the offense or are reluctant to report it;37 
police and prosecutors evaluate the strength of cases on the basis of 
women’s conformance to socio-sexual norms, with attrition rates 
demonstrating the extent to which cases involving drunken or 
provocatively dressed complainants, complainants who have made 
previous allegations, who do not exhibit signs of physical injury, or who 
have an active sexual history, are not taken forward;38 and in turn courts 
(and, in particular, juries) re-affirm these stereotypes - witnessing only a 
tiny proportion of the most conformant cases but nonetheless rigorously 
policing the boundaries of the acceptable, and rarely convicting in a case 
where the complainant’s conduct falls foul of these standards.39 
 36. In many jurisdictions, this has been reflected in a legal requirement that the complainant’s 
will be overborne in the course of the rape, manifesting itself in physical injury as the woman 
‘resists to the utmost’ against her attacker. While, this force requirement has long been formally 
abandoned under English law, it remained a core feature of Scots law until the recent decision of the 
Court of Session in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001), 2002 S.L.T. 466 (H.C.J.). 
 37. See, e.g., Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual 
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. OF 
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 169 (1987); Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual 
Aggression and Victimisation in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT II 4-5 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988); Mary P. Koss, The Underdetection of 
Rape: Methodological Choices Influence Incidence Estimates, 48 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 61, 65-66 
(1992); Mary P. Koss, Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods, 8 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 198, 205 (1993).  But cf. KATIE ROPHIE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, 
FEAR AND FEMINISM (1993).  See also Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103 
PUB. INT. 54 (1991). 
 38. See LIZ KELLY ET AL., UNITED KINGDOM HOME OFFICE, A GAP OR A CHASM? ATTRITION 
IN REPORTED RAPE CASES 46 (2005), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors293.pdf.  
Further review of attrition in rape cases has been conducted via the recent Joint Inspection Report of 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.  See HER MAJESTY’S CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE 
INSPECTORATE, WITHOUT CONSENT: A REPORT ON THE JOINT REVIEW OF INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF RAPE OFFENCES (2007), 
http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/Without_Consent_Thematic.pdf. 
 39. There is considerable social psychology literature which evidences these attitudes 
amongst jurors – for a thorough overview, see Douglas D. Koski, Jury Decisionmaking in Rape 
Trials: A Review & Empirical Assessment, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 21–159 (2002) or GARY D. LAFREE, 
RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989).  For more 
recent evidence of these attitudes in the UK context, see Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, The 
Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution 
in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Finch & 
Munro, Demon Drink]; Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in 
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In this context, it has been argued that the deference afforded to the 
conventional conception of consent in rape laws disguises the extent to 
which men and women do not operate in, choose from, or communicate 
on the basis of an equal and mutually respectful terrain.  On the contrary, 
social stereotypes and anachronistic assumptions about appropriate 
gendered behavior inform our subjectivities (as gendered and sexual 
beings), activities, choices, and assessments of scope for refusal.  Men 
are pressured into the role of sexual hunter and women are encouraged 
to perform the role of sexual prey, which hardly represents the climate of 
mutual equality, dignity, or freedom presumed by the liberal model.  
Building on her critique of the social contract tradition, Carole Pateman 
has emphasized the “failure in liberal-democratic theory and practice to 
distinguish free commitment and agreement by equals from domination, 
subordination, and inequality.”40  And in the specific context of sexual 
relations, Catharine MacKinnon has lodged a similar challenge, insisting 
that the idea of consent, while fundamental to contemporary 
understandings of, and responses to rape, is inadequate, primarily 
because it ignores the reality that men and women do not engage in 
sexual negotiations on an equal footing.41 
In a patriarchal world in which, according to MacKinnon, women 
exist as oppressed victims of male power, tokens of heterosexual 
interest, acquiescence, or even initiative, may be as much a mechanism 
for survival as an expression of legitimate choice.42  With characteristic 
boldness, she suggests that “rape law takes women’s usual response to 
coercion – acquiescence, the despairing response to hopelessness to 
unequal odds – and calls that consent”43 and insists that, in a context in 
which the law licenses men to act as sexual predators, using whatever 
level of force or seduction the patriarchal society deems acceptable, rape 
becomes hard to distinguish from ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse.44 
Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005) [hereinafter Finch & Munro, 
Juror Stereotypes].  There is, however, some literature which indicates that non-conforming women 
may be able to elicit juror sympathy where they demonstrate resistant strategies in the courtroom – 
see Wendy Larcombe, The ‘Ideal’ Victim v Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You Might 
Expect, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 131 (2002). 
 40. Carole Pateman, Women and Consent, in THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, 
FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 83 (1989). 
 41. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 15, at 100. 
 42. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 168 
 43. Id. 
 44. As MacKinnon expresses it - “[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to 
articulate because the unquestionable starting point has been that rape is definable as distinct from 
intercourse, when for women it is difficult to distinguish them under conditions of male 
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There is no doubt that these arguments present a rhetorically and 
politically powerful critique, but commentators have expressed 
increasing concern about the relationship between these assertions and a 
contemporary feminist project that seeks to transcend essentialist claims 
or deterministic prophecies of male/female relations.45  While instances 
of rape and ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse may exist, under 
patriarchy at least, on a continuum, such commentators point out that it 
is difficult to see how equating them can do anything other than belittle 
the experiences both of the rape victim (by making her violation 
‘ordinary’) and of the woman who conceives herself as a voluntary 
sexual agent (by making her intimate connection a violation).  Indeed, as 
Stephen Schulhofer puts it, “[w]e cannot simply dismiss as ‘false 
consciousness’ the perceptions of women themselves.  And for many 
women, sweeping attacks on the possibility of uncoerced sex . . . are 
greatly overdrawn.”46  Thus, while MacKinnon’s claims are perhaps to 
be commended for drawing attention to the constraints and cultural 
pressures that operate upon women’s ability to make sexual choices, her 
failure to discriminate between the different kinds of pressure and her 
refusal to engage with the role that (some) women play in perpetuating – 
or, indeed, resisting – these pressures is theoretically limiting and 
strategically damaging. 
What’s more, it might be argued that it generates premature and / or 
only superficially compelling calls for the abandonment of the consent 
threshold itself.  A number of commentators have argued for a 
reformulation of rape, proposing either to relegate non-consent from 
being a constitutive element of the offence (limiting its presence to 
defensive relevance) or to establish a differentiated ‘familial’ system in 
which a substantive definitional content describes the harm in its 
absence (e.g. rape by coercion, drug assisted rape, rape by force, etc.).47  
dominance.”  Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983). 
 45. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and The Nature of Women: 
Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 352 (1988); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly 
Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990); Angela Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, 
Ideology and Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990); Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, 
The Feminine and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 
100 YALE L.J. 2247 (1991); Emily Jackson, Catharine MacKinnon and Feminist Jurisprudence: A 
Critical Appraisal, 19 J. L. & SOC’Y 195 (1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1181 (1994); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989). 
 46. STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 56 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 47. Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 518 (2006). 
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Such approaches may, however, be problematic.  For one thing, as John 
Gardner and Stephen Shute have argued, in the context of rape, some 
concept of consent is needed to allow people to act, and be respected, as 
moral agents who police the boundaries of their personal intimacy by 
inviting as well as denying sexual access.48  Of course, one might 
respond to this claim – as Victor Tadros has done – by insisting that 
“[e]ven if the concept of consent is central to the most appropriate 
theoretical investigation into the scope of the law of rape,” its excessive 
and inherent ambiguity means that it is simply not useful in the 
delineation of the law itself.49  But this response begs crucial questions 
about the wisdom of concerning oneself “only with practical law 
reform”50 in a context in which the reforms in question generate 
conceptual frameworks that are consciously detached from – and 
arguably at odds with – the wrong, and wrongdoing, that occasions their 
instigation and development.  In addition, it is far from clear that these 
proposed reforms would, in practice, do a great deal to avoid the 
reinsertion of the consent threshold in the courtroom.  Regina Graycar 
and Jenny Morgan have argued that reforms rendering consent a defense 
have not prevented disputes about its presence from arising, and have 
done little to prevent dubious claims about appropriate female socio-
sexual behavior from continuing to inform both judicial and jury 
reasoning.51  Likewise, Jennifer Temkin, having conducted a review of 
the impact of rape reforms in New South Wales, Michigan, and Canada, 
has concluded that “the problem of consent is unlikely to vanish 
whatever means are adopted to deal with it.”52 
It is profoundly disappointing to find that the concept of consent 
has been distorted out of recognition, and too often out of utility, in the 
context of rape law: a context in which one would hope – given the 
importance of what is at stake – that it would be at its most stringent.  
But for all the legitimate concerns expressed in regard to its operation 
here, its potential for more productive deployment in a world beyond 
patriarchy should not be ignored.  Indeed, as Sharon Cowan has 
emphasized, “[c]onsent is a concept which we can fill with either narrow 
liberal values, based on the idea of the subject as an individual atomistic 
rational choice maker, or with feminist values encompassing attention to 
 48. Gardner & Shute, supra note 2, at 193, 207-08. 
 49. Tadros, supra note 47, at 518. 
 50. Id. at 519. 
 51. REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 365-66 (Federation 
Press 2d ed. 2002).  Discussed in Cowan, supra note 4, at 68. 
 52. TEMKIN, supra note 32, at 176. 
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mutuality, embodiment, relational choice, and communication.”53  The 
solution, then, is not to abandon consent as the transformative channel 
between the permissible and the condemnable, but to reformulate it in a 
way that enables it to take greater account of the peculiarities of context, 
constraint, and construction, and to operate with renewed vigor in the 
pursuit of social justice.54  Amongst other things, this approach boasts 
the strategic advantage of preserving a dialogue with liberalism and law 
– on terms that are familiar to it – without denying the complexity of the 
relationship between a woman, the ‘choices’ that she makes, and the 
motivations that drive those choices.  In so doing, it enables moral and 
legal theory to recognize that consent does have meaning for (some) 
women, many of whom experience their heterosexual relationships as an 
expression of agency, without thereby endorsing or entailing the claim 
that “women are immune from various pressures to constrain and 
regulate these relationships, or that such constraints operate to the 
prejudice of women and to the benefit of men, or that the existence of 
such constraints cannot be explained in terms of a disparity of power 
between men and women.”55 
To the extent that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and 
Wales seeks to preserve the role of non-consent as the triggering 
condition for criminality in rape cases, while simultaneously providing a 
more developed understanding of what consent requires in this context, 
it might be argued that this legislation represents a significant step 
forward.  The following section outlines the legislative framework in 
more detail and evaluates its potential to better respect women’s sexual 
autonomy and to protect rape complainants. 
A.  Re-Setting the Boundaries?: The Sexual Offences Act 2003 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is a wide-ranging piece of 
legislation, intended to consolidate and modernize the law in England 
 53. Cowan, supra note 4, at 53. 
 54. Reconstruction, along similar lines, of other (often complementary) concepts in liberal 
legal / political theory have recently been defended in feminist / critical scholarship – see, for 
example, CORNELL, supra note 14; ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003); DAVINA 
COOPER, CHALLENGING DIVERSITY: RETHINKING EQUALITY AND THE VALUE OF DIFFERENCE 
(2004); SIOBHAN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RECLAIMING 
UNIVERSALISM (2006); REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF 
TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di 
Stefano eds., 1996); and VANESSA MUNRO, LAW AND POLITICS AT THE PERIMETER: RE-
EVALUATING KEY DEBATES IN FEMINIST THEORY (2007). 
 55. DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 97 (1998). 
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and Wales on various aspects of socio-sexual life.  Section 1(1) defines 
rape as the non-consensual penile penetration (vaginal, anal, or oral) of 
another person in circumstances in which the defendant does not 
reasonably believe in consent.56  Section 1(2) goes on to state that the 
reasonableness of this belief will be determined in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, including the steps that the defendant took to 
ascertain whether the complainant was consenting.57  Thus, while the 
legislation preserves the traditional focus on consent and belief in 
consent as the threshold for criminality, this offense definition – in 
particular its extension to oral penetration and its shift from the 
defendant’s honest58 to reasonable belief – marks a significant change. 
In addition, where the concept of consent was previously undefined, 
with the jury left to determine its presence by “applying their combined 
good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern 
behaviour” to the facts of each case,59 clear efforts have now been made 
to move beyond this non-prescriptive stance. 
More specifically, the Act imposes a structure for guiding decision-
making on the presence or absence of sexual consent.  It does so in a 
number of ways.  First, it provides a definition of consent under section 
74: “a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
capacity to make that choice.”60  Secondly, it provides, under section 75, 
an exhaustive list of circumstances (including, for example, where force 
or the threat of force has been used or where the “complainant [i]s asleep 
or otherwise unconscious,”61 and the defendant knows this to be the 
case) in which consent and reasonable belief in consent will be 
presumed to be absent.  The Act makes it clear, however, that such 
presumptions can be rebutted by the defendant’s successfully adducing 
evidence that justifies raising the complainant’s consent or his 
reasonable belief therein as an issue for consideration.62  Alongside this 
list, therefore, the Act also sets out, under section 76, two circumstances 
in which the presumption will be conclusive - namely where the 
defendant has intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or 
 56. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(1) (U.K.). 
 57. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(2) (U.K.). 
 58. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C.182 at 188. 
 59. R. v. Olugboja, [1982] Q.B. 320, 332. 
 60. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 74 (U.K.). 
 61. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 75 (U.K.).  Arguably this represents a reduction in the level 
of protection afforded to the complainant, since under the previous position, the fact of 
unconsciousness meant that, as a matter of law, the complainant could not consent – see Larter and 
Castleton, [1995] Crim. L.R. 75 and Malone, [1998] Crim. L.R. 834. 
 62. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 75 (U.K.). 
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purpose of the act or has intentionally induced the complainant to 
consent by impersonating someone she knows.63 
A number of commentators have welcomed this framework’s 
efforts to provide greater guidance on the issue of sexual consent, and 
thereby to improve the consistency and predictability of court decisions 
in rape cases.  Its elevation of at least some situations of intercourse 
under questionable circumstances to a position in which non-consent is 
presumed has been welcomed for sending out important social signals 
about the boundaries of acceptable sexual behavior.  It has been 
submitted that this will encourage more rape complainants to report their 
experiences to the police and secure an increased number of convictions; 
these being core goals driving the reform process.  Despite this, 
however, these provisions have also come under considerable criticism.  
Commentators have, for example, questioned the wisdom of setting up a 
hierarchy of rape, of the sort implied in this three-pronged approach.  In 
addition, concerns have been expressed about the categorization of 
circumstances as between sections 75 and 76,64 and a number of critics 
have challenged the decision to make the list of section 75 circumstances 
exhaustive, lamenting the omission of other situations of dubious 
consent, such as where the complainant is subjected to non-violent 
threats or is self-intoxicated.65 
Of course, where these presumptions do not to apply, this simply 
reverts the evidential balance between prosecution and defense back to 
that which it would have hitherto been.  In these situations, the definition 
of consent under section 74 resumes its central role, as do the provisions 
under section 1(2) in regard to the evaluation of the reasonableness of 
belief.  While the legislation’s attempt here to bring about a more 
communicative understanding of sexuality, grounded in agreement about 
intercourse between the parties, rather than on a presumption of male 
proposition, has been applauded, it has been argued that these provisions 
also present substantial difficulties.  In requiring that a person must have 
 63. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 76 (U.K.). 
 64. Jennifer Temkin & Andrew Ashworth, supra note 4, at 336-37; Jenny McEwan, Proving 
Consent in Sexual Cases: Legislative Change and Cultural Evolution, 9 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 1, 
20-21 (2005). 
 65. See generally Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated 
Consent and Drug Assisted Rape Revisited, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 789.  For further discussion on 
issues surrounding intoxicated sexual consent, see Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Intoxicated 
Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-Assisted Rape, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 773; Karen M. Kramer, 
Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 115 (1994); Alan Wertheimer, Intoxicated Consent to Sexual Relations, 20 LAW & 
PHIL. 373 (2001); and Nicholas Dixon, Alcohol and Rape, 15 PUB. AFF. Q. 341 (2001). 
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the freedom and capacity to make the relevant choice, the definition of 
consent under section 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 directs 
attention more clearly than in the past to the context in which agreement 
to intercourse is given or refused.  In turn, this offers the potential for a 
less one-dimensional understanding of agency, which acknowledges the 
reality that the outcome of the consent binary cannot be radically 
divorced from the circumstances under which the choice is made.  This 
suggests a protection of the value of sexual autonomy which, if 
interpreted broadly, could permit a more complex analysis of the power 
dynamics and cultural pressures that operate to constrain a person’s 
freedom and capacity to make sexual choices.  In reality, however, the 
extent to which section 74 is capable of producing this result remains 
uncertain. 
Terms such as freedom, choice and capacity can be interpreted in 
radically divergent and often minimalist ways.  In the specific context of 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is clear that these terms are not 
intended to imply absolute freedom or choice.  As a result, however, “all 
the questions about how much liberty of action satisfies the ‘definition’ 
remain at large.”66  Responsibility for this interpretation is left first in 
the hands of the judiciary and then with jurors who will apply judicial 
guidance to the circumstances of each case.67  In recent case law, 
however, the judiciary has been reluctant to propose any substantive 
development of these tests in the directions that are given to the jury,68 
and recent research with mock jurors – conducted by the author –
indicates significant variability in the way in which these ideas of 
freedom and capacity will be applied.69  Indeed, without greater 
guidance, it seems that the new legislation – though intended to promote 
 66. Temkin & Ashworth, supra note 64, at 336. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 256.  For an excellent discussion of this 
judgment and the issues arising therefrom, see Philip Rumney & Rachel Fenton, Intoxicated 
Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making, MOD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with 
author). 
 69. Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Breaking Boundaries: Sexual Consent in the Jury Room, 
26 LEGAL STUD. 303, 315-16 (2006) [hereinafter Finch & Munro, Breaking Boundaries].  While 
some jurors read the legislation as requiring something “active rather than passive” - as “saying that 
consent isn’t just being there and not saying no” - many others adopted a different position, 
commenting: “I think maybe that’s why she consented, because she didn’t say anything” or “in 
order to not consent you have to . . . she has to actually make it clear that she has not consented.”  
Id. at 316.  Even in the case of a heavily intoxicated complainant, moreover, a number of the jurors 
illustrated the tenacity of the force requirement insisting that they would expect to find evidence of 
struggle / injury to establish non-consent.  Id.  For further discussion of the mock jurors’ discussions 
around the issue of intoxication in particular, see Finch & Munro, Demon Drink, supra note 39.   
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/5
MUNRO_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:23 PM 
2008] CONSTRUCTING CONSENT 945 
 
a more proactive and communicative understanding of sexuality – may 
do little to prevent jurors from continuing to presume consent in the 
absence of positive dissent.70 
Similar problems emerge, moreover, in regard to the provisions 
under the Act relating to the defendant’s belief in consent.  The Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 shifts the position from one in which an honest, 
albeit unreasonable, belief in consent sufficed to absolve the defendant 
of liability, to one in which any such belief must be reasonable.  While 
this represents a (not uncontroversial) departure from ordinary standards 
of criminal responsibility, it was accepted that there were peculiar and 
legitimate grounds for holding defendants to a higher level of 
accountability in the rape context.  In particular, it was deemed to be 
relevant that the parties would be in close proximity, such that the 
defendant’s responsibility to ensure consent could be easily discharged, 
and that intercourse in its absence would constitute both a violation of 
the victim’s bodily integrity and a disregard for her sexual autonomy.  
But even if imposing a reasonable belief threshold can be justified on 
these grounds (and I believe that it can), it is less than clear that it will 
operate in practice to hold defendants to a higher level of accountability. 
There is, after all, considerable evidence of tenacious and popular, 
but fundamentally questionable, views about ‘appropriate’ sexual 
behavior in our society.  Of course, the fact that many people believe 
that women who say no do not always mean it, or that men are entitled 
to use proactive strategies to secure intercourse,71 does not speak to the 
reasonableness of those beliefs as such, but it does suggest that these 
views are more likely to be deemed reasonable when assessed by a jury 
of peers in the rape trial.  Certainly, in the mock study mentioned above, 
it was clear that jurors often deduced sexual consent (or at least the 
defendant’s reasonable belief therein) from other, unrelated, events that 
 70. Id. See also Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Of Bodies, Boundaries and Borders: 
Intoxicated Sexual Consent Under the Law of Scotland and England, JURIDICAL REV. 53 (2005); 
Finch & Munro, Juror Stereotypes, supra note 39. 
 71. E. Sandra Byers & Paula Wilson, Accuracy of Women’s Expectations Regarding Men’s 
Responses to Refusals of Sexual Advances in Dating Situations, 8 INT’L J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. 376, 
385 (1985).  In the Byers and Wilson study, fewer than 40% of male and female respondents 
interpreted a woman’s direct, unqualified refusal to mean that she wanted a man to immediately 
stop his advances.  Id. at 384.  This skepticism may be attributed to belief in ‘scripted refusals’ by 
women who wish to engage in sex, but who wish to avoid the appearance of sexual promiscuity. 
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Marcia L. McCoy, Double Standard / Double Bind: The Sexual Double 
Standard and Women’s Communication About Sex, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 447, 448-49 (1991); 
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean 
Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988). 
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lacked temporal correspondence with the intercourse.  The introduction 
of these wider circumstantial factors allowed jurors to rely on a range of 
(ill-founded) views about ‘appropriate’ socio-sexual interaction.  Thus, 
for example, several jurors argued that it would be reasonable for the 
defendant to believe that the complainant was consenting to intercourse 
if she “had been drinking all night and flirting with him.”72  The 
likelihood that such patterns will emerge in ‘real’ jury deliberations is 
strengthened, moreover, by section 1(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, which, rather than relying on a ‘reasonable person’ standard, 
adopts a general test of what is reasonable in all the circumstances.73  
Critics have argued that, if interpreted broadly, this test not only permits, 
but invites, jurors “to scrutinise the complainant’s behaviour to 
determine whether there was anything about it which could have induced 
a reasonable belief in consent.”74 
At the same time, moreover, this phrasing of the mens rea test also 
permits scope for the personal characteristics of the defendant to play a 
role in assessing reasonableness.  Introduced to permit flexibility in the 
case of defendants who exhibit individual characteristics (youth, low IQ, 
etc.) that make an unmodified objective standard unduly harsh, section 
1(2) refuses to specify which circumstances and characteristics are 
relevant, and in Parliamentary debates preceding the legislation, it was 
suggested that the judge and jury would determine this in every case.75  
But, as Catharine MacKinnon has insisted, “[t]o attempt to solve [the 
problem of rape] by adopting reasonable belief as a standard without 
asking, on a substantive social basis, to whom the belief is reasonable 
and why – meaning, what conditions make it reasonable – is one-sided: 
male-sided.”76  In the context of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, Sharon 
Cowan has developed this position, cautioning that this legislative 
flexibility in favor of the defendant may be secured at the cost of 
rendering it reasonable for an accused who has “led an especially 
sheltered life, in a rural place, within a sexist family, has not been 
schooled in the shifting gender power relations of the twenty-first 
century” to believe, for example, that a woman is consenting to 
intercourse despite her verbal protestations.77 
In the final analysis, then, it seems that while the Sexual Offences 
 72. Finch & Munro, Breaking Boundaries, supra note 69 
 73. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(2) (U.K.). 
 74. Temkin & Ashworth, supra note 64, at 341-42. 
 75. Lord Falconer, 648 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 1074-75. 
 76. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 183. 
 77. Cowan, supra note 4, at 62. 
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Act 2003 could be interpreted and applied by the courts in a truly 
progressive way that would redress many of the substantial concerns that 
have been raised above in regard to consent in general, and sexual 
consent in particular, it is far from clear that it will operate in this way in 
practice.  To some extent, of course, this conclusion raises inevitable 
questions about the relationship between legal reform and social change, 
and more specifically about whether the promotion of a genuinely 
context-sensitive and deconstructed understanding of sexual consent can 
– or indeed should – be something that we look to the criminal law to 
achieve.  These questions will be reflected upon further in the following 
section, which also develops an argument in favor of a ‘consent-plus’ 
model that acknowledges the influence of external pressures on personal 
self-determination and – without necessarily seeking their elimination – 
subjects these forces to critical scrutiny, in the hope of moving beyond 
false consciousness or ‘submit to survive’ acquiescence and towards a 
self-reflective and experientially correspondent sense of (sexual) 
autonomy. 
IV.  DECONSTRUCTING CHOICE: FREEDOM, CAPACITY & 
REASONABLENESS IN THE SEXUAL CONTEXT 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides a useful illustration of the 
extent to which legal standards that at first sight appear to be exacting 
will often fail to translate into demanding thresholds when removed 
from the lofty isolation of abstract theorizing and transposed into the 
messy realities of everyday socio-sexual life.  As discussed above, the 
notion that women meaningfully consent to sex only where they exercise 
a choice to do so, in conditions in which they enjoy both freedom and 
capacity, indicates a rigorous threshold that has the potential to render 
non-consensual many mundane instances in which women engage in 
intercourse with male partners / spouses purely out of a sense of 
relational obligation, to strengthen their relative bargaining position, or 
in pursuit of improved social status.  In practice, however, the legislation 
is likely to be interpreted in a significantly more reductive way, with the 
existence of freedom and capacity being evidenced by the absence of 
obvious counter-veiling coercion, deception, or stupefaction. 
No doubt, there are many who would defend precisely such an 
approach – insisting that anything other than this ‘consensual 
minimalism’ would be both unjust and unjustifiable, expanding the reach 
of the state into our private and sexual lives in hitherto unprecedented 
ways and imposing upon male suitors an arduous burden to discharge 
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their potential criminal responsibility for non-consensual intercourse by 
undertaking an investigation, not only of the averred articulations of 
their partners, but also of their inner desires, motivations, and psyche, as 
well as of their levels of social and economic power.78  While (at least 
some of) these concerns may be legitimate, it will be argued in this 
section that this kind of totalizing ‘all-or-nothing’ perspective is 
disappointing.  There is a real danger that, without some more proactive 
development, this new piece of legislation will simply re-trace the steps 
of its predecessor.  Focusing attention only on the most obvious 
impediments to agency, it risks undermining the more progressive 
intentions of (some of) its drafters by failing to offer any more 
sophisticated analysis of the boundaries of permissibility in the myriad 
sexual scenarios in which, despite the absence of such impediments, it is 
clear that full and free choice is nonetheless lacking. 
Theorists who, in the past, have sought to challenge this kind of 
minimalist approach have often done so by adopting a ‘consent-plus’ 
model, according to which something more than a mere token of 
acquiescence (or even affirmation), in the absence of coercion or 
deception, is required in order to render sexual contact (legally / 
morally) permissible.  Theorists like Eva Kittay,79 Lois Pineau,80 
Elizabeth Anderson,81 and Martha Chamallas82 have, in their different 
ways, all insisted that reciprocal sexual desire, experiences of sexual 
pleasure, or mutual sexual attraction and affirmation of an emotionally 
intimate relationship must also accompany a token of sexual consent in 
order to render it an expression of genuine agency; and have disputed the 
validity of ‘consensual’ sex embarked upon for any other (instrumental) 
reason.  These theorists are to be commended for their efforts both to 
 78. The threshold of ‘consensual minimalism’ has recently been defended by Alan 
Wertheimer.  ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 130 (2003).  He defines it as 
entailing that “a sexual relationship is permissible if it is consensual in some reasonably 
straightforward sense. . . .”  Id.  Thus, while any circumstances of force, coercion or deception stand 
to be evaluated in terms of their effect on the validity of consent, in the absence of these conditions, 
a prima facie token of consent will be sufficient in itself to render sexual contact permissible. Id. at 
140. For an examination of the merits and demerits of Wertheimer’s analysis of sexual consent, see 
Vanessa Munro, Concerning Consent: Standards of Permissibility in Sexual Relations, 25 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (2005). 
 79. Eva Fede Kittay, Ah! My Foolish Heart: A Reply to Alan Soble’s “Antioch’s ‘Sexual 
Offence Policy’: A Philosophical Exploration”, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 153 (1997). 
 80. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, 
AND THE LAW 1 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996). 
 81. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). 
 82. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988). 
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interrogate behind the veil of affirmative tokening in the (hetero)sexual 
context and to render the transformative power of consent contingent 
upon a higher standard of subjective engagement and wantedness.  Their 
insistence upon the importance of mutuality in sexual contact is 
valuable, especially in a context in which there is considerable evidence 
that women do engage in ‘consensual but unwanted’ sexual relations 
with men.83  At the same time, however, these approaches have been 
criticized for arbitrarily privileging some reasons for engaging in 
intercourse over equally viable alternatives, with little clear justification.  
While this presents a powerful model, it risks excessive protectionism, 
as well as a problematic refusal to engage with the narratives of many 
women who consciously participate in sexual intercourse in exchange 
for other benefits, without any resultant sense of self-alienation, 
exploitation, or violation. 
In light of this critique, a more promising way of moving beyond 
‘consensual minimalism’ may be found in the claim that genuine agency 
is expressed, not simply when individuals are in a position to articulate 
and implement their desires, but when they have hitherto ‘taken charge’ 
of those desires in a particular way.84  At the heart of this approach is a 
privileging of people’s ‘programmatic’ choices about how they really 
want to live their lives over their more impulsive and intuitive ‘episodic’ 
preferences.85  Under this approach, before she can exercise a 
meaningful and transformative choice, the female agent must have 
adopted a seriously self-engaged and evaluative approach to the sexual 
act in question.  This does not mean that she can only become involved 
in serious sexual relationships, but it does mean that the decision to 
engage in more frivolous exchanges must be the outcome of serious 
reflection and endorsement.  Without jettisoning the importance of 
mutuality or underestimating the impact of disciplinary norms and 
disparities of power / resources, this approach shifts, then, from the 
substantive consent-plus model of Kittay et al. towards a more 
 83. A survey conducted in the United States, for example, revealed that while 91% of female 
respondents indicated that their first experience of intercourse was consensual, one quarter of them 
nonetheless rated its level of wantedness as low (4 out of 10 or below).  See JODY RAPHAEL, 
SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE AND POVERTY 49 (2000). For further discussion 
of this survey, see Joyce Abma, Anne Driscoll & Kristin Moore, Young Women’s Degree of Control 
over their First Intercourse: An Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 14 (1998). 
 84. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY ESSAY ON BENTHAM 189 
(Mary Warnock ed., 1962). For further discussion on this, see ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND 
TRUST IN BIOETHICS 31 (2004). 
 85. For further discussion of this distinction between episodic and programmatic choice, and 
its implications on the operation of autonomy, see DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND 
PERSONAL CHOICE (1989); FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF (Diana T. Meyers ed., 1997). 
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procedural insistence on critical reflection about the reasons that 
underpin, constrain, construct, and motivate our choices.  According to 
Stephen Schulhofer, this model demands that agents engage in 
“conscious reflection about preferences and a deliberate choice of one’s 
goals.”86  It is not enough to ensure that a person’s preferences are not 
“deformed by false beliefs, artificially constraining cultural pressures, or 
the need to minimize psychic stress.”87  Indeed, active steps must also be 
taken – if necessary by the state – to ensure what Joseph Raz has called 
‘autonomy’ competence.88  Thus, this approach goes beyond the 
minimalist baseline, not only insisting that there be an absence of 
immediate obstacles to valid consent (e.g. coercion or deception), but 
also that adequate education be provided to enable people to manage 
their long-term self-determination, that a range of genuine and realistic 
alternatives be made available for people to choose from, and that a 
culture be promoted which actively encourages introspection about one’s 
personal desires.89 
As Alan Wertheimer has argued, it may be reasonable to assume, 
prima facie, that a person who tokens consent to sexual relations always 
does so expecting some kind of reciprocal benefit.90  What the consent-
plus model emphasizes, however, is that it is not enough to simply take 
this expectation, or the motivations that underpin it, at face value.  While 
there is flexibility here as to its substantive content, the extent to which 
the consenting party genuinely endorses and values this benefit (in the 
overall context of her unique life narrative, personal relationships, and 
subjective desires) remains central.  And this is important since, as 
discussed above, the construction and constraint imposed on women’s 
(sexual) agency – by a complex network of socio-economic inequality, 
cultural expectations and relational obligations that encourage 
submissive femininity and controlled (but available) sexual access – 
make it likely that there will be many situations in which a woman will 
engage in sexual exchanges in pursuit of a benefit that, on closer 
inspection, she does not endorse.91  Imagine, for example, a woman who 
 86. SCHULHOFER, supra note 46, at 106 
 87. Id. 
 88. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 203-06 (1986). 
 89. SCHULHOFER, supra note 46, at 106. 
 90. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 140. 
 91. Abrams, supra note 45, at 764-65.  Debate over the legitimacy, and possibility, of consent 
emerges in a range of contexts involving women’s sexuality – these are particularly prominent, for 
example, in debates around prostitution policy and sex trafficking, but also feature in discussions 
about pornography, marriage, compulsory heterosexuality, and compulsory motherhood, etc. For 
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has sex with her male partner, not so much because she wants to, but 
because she knows that he wants her to.  In the absence of overt coercion 
or deception, this would be condoned and normalized as an 
unproblematic instance of consensual sex under a minimalist approach.  
But under this more ambitious consent-plus model, that conclusion 
would have to be postponed pending an investigation of the context of, 
and motivations underpinning, the intercourse.  If the woman complied 
because she loves her partner, values their relationship and knows that 
responding to his sexual advances is important to its health, this may be 
a legitimate expression of agency, reflecting her endorsement of the 
benefits that accrue to her as a result of the exchange.  By contrast, if she 
complied because she fears she cannot survive financially without him 
or is afraid of his (as yet unthreatened) retribution in the event of 
rebuttal, her involvement emerges as self-alienating, undertaken in 
pursuit of an unendorsed benefit, and thus problematic.  This approach 
continues, therefore, to track the expectation of reciprocal benefit but, 
unlike more minimalist analyses of sexual agency, it interrogates the 
context of decision-making to ensure actual rather than assumed 
subjective value.  Amongst other things, this has the benefit of paying 
close attention to the diverse ways in which both institutionalized 
structures of power / knowledge and localized familial / communal 
imperatives influence an individual’s desires.  In so doing, it also 
confronts the willful blindness of the dominant rhetoric around agency, 
self-determination, and consent, and – crucially – serves to reconnect an 
abstract sexual choice with the concrete context in which that choice is 
framed, selected, and then acted upon.92 
Perhaps most significantly, this model creates a forum in which 
agency can be encouraged, fostered, and exercised without resort to a 
utopian vision of self-determination in which constraint and construction 
are transcended, avoided, or eliminated.  Centering on the endorsement 
of some anticipated reciprocal benefit as the necessary companion to any 
apparently valid token of consent, this approach does not demand that 
people be elevated from the practical and theoretical limitations that 
impinge upon their decision-making.  Instead, it is enough that the 
parties, exercising choice within the social constraints incumbent upon 
them, have critically evaluated, and then integrated the values reflected 
further development of the ways in which exchanges operate in sexual relations, see LINDA R. 
HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998). 
 92. For recent re-engagements with female agency, see, for example, LOIS MCNAY, GENDER 
AND AGENCY: RECONFIGURING THE SUBJECT IN FEMINIST AND SOCIAL THEORY (2000); and DIANA 
T. MEYERS, GENDER IN THE MIRROR: CULTURAL IMAGERY AND WOMEN’S AGENCY (2002). 
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in the choices that they make.  Thus, while other approaches might 
dictate that the prostitute who tokens consent to sex in exchange for 
money can never be exercising genuine agency, this approach asserts 
that – in the absence of the control of pimps or the compulsion of drug-
addiction, etc. – this may constitute a meaningful choice, so long as she 
has previously both reflected upon and reconciled (as at least some sex 
workers appear to do) her selling of sex as a coherent and endorsed 
aspect of her life narrative.  Of course, this in no way entails that we 
should divert attention away from interrogating the broader socio-
economic constraints that impact upon this woman in her reflective 
process, challenging them where necessary in pursuit of a more just 
distribution of resources and expectations.  But it does ensure that the 
focus is on those instances in which the parties experience the pain of 
self-alienation and a lack of ‘wantedness’ through their sexual 
participation.  As a result, it allows critical engagement with the 
discursive and relational circumstances that define the confines of a 
person’s sexual decision-making, without submerging that person’s 
ability to speak within the structural dictates of these circumstances – 
and it makes it clear that, as Brenda Baker has argued, “[i]t is not 
reasonable to expect consent to do all the work needed for sexual 
equality. . . .”93 
A.  Legislating for Critical Reciprocity - Promoting Justice or Just 
Convictions? 
Nicola Lacey has suggested that “[w]hile the idea of autonomy as 
independence seems directly relevant to the wrong of rape, it dominates 
at the expense of the development of a positive conception of what kinds 
of sexual relationships matter to personhood.”94  Building on that 
insight, discussion in this section has sought to develop an approach that 
would better attend to this deeper understanding of personhood.  Where 
the conventional model of agency has tended to ignore background 
factors of social constructionism, and more radical critique has 
paternalistically overruled their effects, this approach respects the 
agent’s felt convictions whilst insisting that the benefits perceived to 
accrue in any sexual exchange are always subjected to critical analysis.  
As a result, it demands a serious engagement with the question of 
whether the intercourse in question was not only not resisted and not 
 93. Brenda Baker, Understanding Consent in Sexual Assault, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: 
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 49, 64 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999). 
 94. UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS, supra note 14, at 117. 
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undertaken as a result of coercion / deception, but was also welcome, 
wanted and non-alienating when judged from the experiential point of 
view of the parties. 
While this model provides a standard of sexual intimacy that, it is 
submitted, we should aspire to privilege in the myriad social sites in 
which disciplinary discourses are constituted and circulated, there can be 
little doubt that transposing it into a fair and efficient legal framework is 
no easy task.  For one thing, the process of tracing the integration of 
values within a person’s life-plan may be too complicated for an 
instrument as notoriously blunt as the law to accommodate well.  Not 
only are there concerns about how we would go about locating the 
evidence with which to make assessments on the legitimacy of a 
person’s preferences, but there are also problems with the state’s ability 
to make determinations on such issues from its necessarily detached 
perspective.  In addition, there are public policy reasons to avoid 
allowing the law to over-reach into areas of personal living, and it would 
be a substantial departure from practice in other areas if we were 
required to interrogate prima facie valid tokens of sexual consent in 
order to assess their integration within a person’s overall life-plan.  Of 
course, the fact that state intervention is generally treated with suspicion 
does not entail that it is always unjustifiable, and it may be that in this 
context there are compelling reasons – grounded in the value of 
autonomy and the need to prevent other-imposed harm – that permit this 
kind of investigation wherever the less coercive mechanisms engaged at 
other disciplinary sites have failed to impact adequately upon sexual 
negotiation practices.95 
Perhaps more significantly, though, the adoption of this approach in 
law would also give rise to some very difficult questions from the 
defendant’s point of view.  Even assuming that the law is capable of 
engaging with contextual and psychic nuances sufficiently to recognize 
and accredit those situations in which a women’s token of consent to 
intercourse is not in fact supported by a critical endorsement of the 
benefits associated with the exchange, it may be unduly demanding to 
hold a defendant criminally liable for rape as a result of his failure to do 
the same.  Indeed, in a context in which the defendant may have already 
taken reasonable steps to secure the woman’s token of consent, to insist 
that he must also ensure that this token is not tainted with self-alienation 
 95. For further discussion on the nature of these negotiation strategies – and a defense of their 
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(generated, perhaps, by subtle social or psychic dynamics out with his 
control) may seem excessively burdensome – and some would add, 
highly unromantic.  This may be particularly so in the case of a 
defendant who has had no (or a limited) prior relationship with the 
complainant, and who, as a result, would be wholly ill-placed to assess 
whether her tokened affirmation (or even initiation) of sexual intercourse 
really means yes.96 
Bearing in mind these difficulties, the upshot of transposing this 
model into law may be one in which feminist victories won at the actus 
reus stage in rape trials will be un-done by assessments of mens rea that 
refuse to see the defendant’s belief in consent as unreasonable.  For 
those who pursue rape law reform purely in order to secure greater 
convictions, this may emerge, in the final analysis, as somewhat 
disappointing.  But at the same time, as was acknowledged in the 
drafting of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the role of law in society 
extends beyond the confines of the criminal courtroom.  Indeed, this re-
engagement with the consent threshold affords an opportunity for the 
law to lead by example, holding out a model of sexual relations that 
takes both mutuality and reciprocity seriously, and thereby generating 
attitudinal changes that may, in time, permit holding defendants to a 
higher level of accountability in regard to their sexual communication 
strategies.  In addition, the extent to which this approach puts the 
experiential perspective of the complainant centre stage, at least in its 
evaluation of the actus reus component of the offence, is itself 
symbolically important, since this perspective has too often been 
neglected, distorted or rejected in the rape context by both legal and 
feminist analyses. 
Notably, as discussed above, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is 
already drafted in terms that would permit it to move in this kind of 
critical reciprocity consent-plus direction.  It is true, in fact, that a fully 
expansive interpretation, in which the concepts of freedom and capacity 
would retain the hue of transcendence and self-willed action associated 
with their Enlightenment origins, would actually pose the threat of being 
over-inclusive.  Perhaps it is the specter of this that lies behind the 
judicial reluctance, evidenced in case decisions to date, to flesh out the 
contours of the new legislative tests on consent in a way that would 
require jurors to abandon their typically minimalist interpretive baseline.  
 96. I am grateful to Sharon Cowan for pointing out that there is, of course, a counter to this, 
which would insist that these are precisely the situations in which men should be held to a higher 
standard, since they have no background context of a relationship against which to judge the quality 
of the token of consent. 
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Whatever the reason, it is submitted that – to fulfill its progressive 
potential – the legislation, and any subsequent law reform that builds 
upon it, must embrace rather than abandon the (messy) middle ground 
between minimalism and utopianism staked out here.  Whether this 
requires more legislative intervention, expanded judicial instructions, 
targeted (myth-dispelling) education for jurors, or a combination of all 
three, remains to be seen, but it is telling – and appropriate – that policy-
makers in England and Wales should be considering these strategies so 
soon after the passing of the Act.97 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Women (and many men) are enmeshed in institutionalized 
structures of power-knowledge that often thwart “their efforts to achieve 
[ ] cognitive and moral autonomy,” such that they “too often live as self-
fulfilling prophecies” conforming to normative roles that have been 
scripted for them rather than developing extensive and expansive 
avenues for effective agency.98  In a context in which the terrain of 
social, political, and economic power is far from gender equal and a 
woman’s sexuality can be deployed to secure greater benefits, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that many women engage in sex that is not 
genuinely experienced by them as ‘wanted.’  There are certainly strong 
reasons to continue to criticize and challenge these differential 
distributions of social benefit, but – as noted in regard to Catharine 
MacKinnon’s work – there is little to be gained by blanket refusal to 
accredit any tokens of (sexual) consent issued by women under current 
conditions.  In any social context, a person’s preferences are never 
entirely self-generated, and to attribute an individual woman’s 
experiences of autonomy to false consciousness or patriarchal complicity 
may be to misrepresent her own position as well as to overstate the 
parameters of agency that are achievable for women (or men) in a post-
patriarchal world. 
Of course, it is important not to conflate a token of consent with an 
expression of wantedness, but problematising the gulf between these two 
triggers for intimacy does not require the rejection of the consent 
 97. Proposals to provide clearer definition on the meaning of capacity for the purposes of 
section 74 and to introduce general expert evidence to educate jurors about the realities of rape were 
put forward for public consultation in 2006. The Government’s response to this consultation 
exercise has yet to be finalized, but it is notable that the proposals have been rejected by the 
judiciary and others as being unnecessary.  Home Office, Convicting Rapists, supra note 4. 
 98. Lorraine Code, The Unicorn in the Garden, in WOMEN AND REASON 263, 265 (Elizabeth 
D. Harvey & Kathleen Okruhlik eds., 1992). 
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threshold so much as the rejection of any minimalist interpretation 
thereof.  Adopting the more demanding consent-plus model offered here 
cannot, and does not, purport to resolve all the dilemmas that will arise 
when we examine the legitimacy of tokens of consent uttered in 
everyday socio-sexual life.  It does, however, ensure that we begin to ask 
the right questions – questions that pay attention to the narratives 
presented by those who claim agency without taking their affirmations at 
face value, and that avoid the double-bind between ignoring and 
resigning ourselves to constraints on free choice.  What is required is not 
only a token of affirmation but also a sensation – not so much of control 
over the social structures that shape our lives (which may be illusory) – 
but of critical endorsement of the way in which the dictates of those 
structures are integrated and incorporated into personal narratives.99  
While the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales offers the 
potential for this kind of approach, it is unlikely to produce it, 
particularly in a context in which the judiciary are stubbornly resistant to 
claims that concepts of ‘freedom’ or ‘capacity’ require explanation, in 
which liberal ideals of abstract subjectivity and unfettered autonomy fail 
to capture reality, and in which jurors (immersed, by contrast, in that 
reality) cling to minimalist interpretations. 
 99. JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT – FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE BODY 37 (1991) 
(quoting Karen Rian, Sadomasochism and the Social Construction of Desire, in ROBIN RUTH 
LINDEN ET AL., AGAINST SADOMASOCHISM: A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS 49 (1982)). 
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